SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
JOHN B DEMPSEY v. RALPH MARTIN, DISTRICT
ATTORNEY FOR SUFFOLK COUNTY
ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
No. 99-5283. Decided October 12, 1999
   PER CURIAM.
   Pro se petitioner Dempsey seeks leave to proceed in 
forma pauperis under Rule 39 of this Court.  We deny this 
request as frivolous pursuant to Rule 39.8.  Dempsey is 
allowed until November 2, 1999, within which to pay the 
docketing fees required by Rule 38 and to submit his 
petition in compliance with this Court's Rule 33.1.  We 
also direct the Clerk not to accept any further petitions for 
certiorari or petitions for extraordinary writs from 
Dempsey in noncriminal matters unless he first pays the 
docketing fee required by Rule 38 and submits his peti-
tions in compliance with Rule 33.1.
   Dempsey has abused this Court's certiorari and extraor-
dinary writ processes.  On October 5, 1992, we invoked 
Rule 39.8 to deny Dempsey in forma pauperis status with 
respect to a petition for certiorari.  See Dempsey v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 506 U. S. 810.  At that time, Dempsey had 
filed 11 petitions for certiorari and 1 petition for an ex-
traordinary writ, all of which were both frivolous and had 
been denied without recorded dissent.  Since that time, 
Dempsey has filed five petitions for certiorari, all of which 
were also frivolous and denied without recorded dissent.  
The instant petition for certiorari thus brings Dempsey's 
total number of frivolous filings to 19.
   We enter the order barring prospective filings for the 
reasons discussed in Martin v. District of Columbia Court 
of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).  Dempsey's 
abuse of the writ of certiorari and of the extraordinary 
writs has been in noncriminal cases, and we limit our 
sanction accordingly.  The order therefore will not prevent 
Dempsey from petitioning to challenge criminal sanctions 
which might be imposed on him.  The order will, however, 
allow this Court to devote its limited resources to the 
claims of petitioners who have not abused our processes.
It is so ordered.
   JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
   For reasons previously stated, see Martin v. District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1, 4 (1992) 
(STEVENS, J., dissenting), and cases cited, I respectfully 
dissent.